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Julia K. Steinberger 4
For over half a century, worldwide growth in affluence has continuously increased resource
use and pollutant emissions far more rapidly than these have been reduced through better
technology. The affluent citizens of the world are responsible for most environmental impacts
and are central to any future prospect of retreating to safer environmental conditions. We
summarise the evidence and present possible solution approaches. Any transition towards
sustainability can only be effective if far-reaching lifestyle changes complement technological
advancements. However, existing societies, economies and cultures incite consumption
expansion and the structural imperative for growth in competitive market economies inhibits
necessary societal change.
Recent scientists’ warnings confirm alarming trends of environmental degradation fromhuman activity, leading to profound changes in essential life-sustaining functions of planetEarth1–3. The warnings surmise that humanity has failed to find lasting solutions to these
changes that pose existential threats to natural systems, economies and societies and call for
action by governments and individuals.
The warnings aptly describe the problems, identify population, economic growth and afflu-
ence as drivers of unsustainable trends and acknowledge that humanity needs to reassess the role
of growth-oriented economies and the pursuit of affluence1,2. However, they fall short of clearly
identifying the underlying forces of overconsumption and of spelling out the measures that are
needed to tackle the overwhelming power of consumption and the economic growth paradigm4.
This perspective synthesises existing knowledge and recommendations from the scientific
community. We provide evidence from the literature that consumption of affluent households
worldwide is by far the strongest determinant and the strongest accelerator of increases of global
environmental and social impacts. We describe the systemic drivers of affluent overconsumption
and synthesise the literature that provides possible solutions by reforming or changing economic
systems. These solution approaches range from reformist to radical ideas, including degrowth,
eco-socialism and eco-anarchism. Based on these insights, we distil recommendations for further
research in the final section.
Affluence as a driver of environmental and social impacts
The link between consumption and impacts. There exists a large body of literature in which the
relationship between environmental, resource and social impacts on one hand, and possible
explanatory variables on the other, is investigated. We review and summarise those studies that
holistically assess the impact of human activities, in the sense that impacts are not restricted to
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the home, city, or territory of the individuals, but instead are
counted irrespective of where they occur. Such an assessment
perspective is usually referred to as consumption-based
accounting, or footprinting5.
Allocating environmental impacts to consumers is consistent
with the perspective that consumers are the ultimate drivers of
production, with their purchasing decisions setting in motion a
series of trade transactions and production activities, rippling
along complex international supply-chain networks5. However,
allocating impacts to consumers does not necessarily imply a
systemic causal understanding of which actor should be held
most responsible for these impacts. Responsibility may lie with
the consumer or with an external actor, like the state, or in
structural relations between actors. Scholars of sustainable
consumption have shown that consumers often have little control
over environmentally damaging decisions along supply chains6,
however they often do have control over making a consumption
decision in the first place. Whilst in Keynesian-type economics
consumer demand drives production, Marxian political econom-
ics as well as environmental sociology views the economy as
supply dominated7. In this paper, we highlight the measurement
of environmental impacts of consumption, while noting that
multiple actors bear responsibility.
Holistic studies of the environmental or social consequences of
consumption usually involve the use of life-cycle assessment or
input-output analysis that do not only account for direct (on-site,
within-territory) but importantly also include indirect impacts
occurring along global and complete supply chains8,9. The use of
such methods is important, because failing to detect the
outsourcing of indirect impacts (also called spill overs or leakage)
has the potential to seriously undermine global environmental
abatement efforts, e.g. on climate change10.
A significant proportionality between consumption and impact
exists for a large range of environmental, resource and social
indicators. The implications of consumption on scarce energy
resources emerged already in the 1970s and was confirmed by
many consumption-based analyses on indicators as varied as CO2
emissions, raw materials, air pollution, biodiversity, nitrogen
emissions, scarce water use or energy5,11. Many of these studies
employed multiple regression or similar techniques, yielding clear
evidence for our first finding: that consumption is by far the
strongest determinant of global impacts, dwarfing other socio-
economic–demographic factors such as age, household size,
qualification or dwelling structure12–15. Whilst the strength of the
proportionality between consumption and impact decreases
slightly towards higher incomes (measured by so-called elasti-
cities), consumption was found to be a consistently positive
driver. In other words, the impact intensity of consumption
decreases, but absolute impacts increase towards higher con-
sumption. Absolute decoupling, let alone an inverted-U-type
Kuznets relationship, does not occur from a consumption-based
accounting perspective11,16,17.
For some social indicators, causal associations between
consumption and impact are weak or non-existent. For example,
withdrawing consumption from countries with unequal wages,
child labour, corruption or severe occupational hazards may not
influence those conditions, and might even exacerbate social
problems. Footprint studies on these indicators nevertheless
characterise consumers of commodities from socially problematic
origins as being implicated with detrimental impacts9,18–20.
Trends. Many indicators of global environmental and social
impacts have been monitored over time, and time series data
exist5. Numerous global studies decomposing time series of
footprints of consumption into drivers of trends have been
carried out over the past decades, for example on greenhouse-gas
emissions, energy use, water use, materials or mercury emissions.
These studies routinely decompose global impact trends into
effects due to changes in a number of factors, such as technology,
the input structure of production, the product mix in consumer
demand, the level of per-capita consumption or population21.
The majority of studies agree that by far the major drivers of
global impacts are technological change and per-capita consump-
tion11. Whilst the former acts as a more or less strong retardant,
the latter is a strong accelerator of global environmental impact.
Remarkably, consumption (and to a lesser extent population)
growth have mostly outrun any beneficial effects of changes in
technology over the past few decades. These results hold for the
entire world22,23 as well as for numerous individual
countries11,24–26. Figure 1 shows the example of changes in
global-material footprint and greenhouse-gas emissions com-
pared to GDP over time. The overwhelming evidence from
decomposition studies is that globally, burgeoning consumption
has diminished or cancelled out any gains brought about by
technological change aimed at reducing environmental impact11.
Furthermore, low-income groups are rapidly occupying
middle- and high-income brackets around the world. This can
potentially further exacerbate the impacts of mobility-related
consumption, which has been shown to disproportionately
increase with income (i.e. the elasticity is larger than one27).
This means that if consumption is not addressed in future efforts
for mitigating environmental impact, technological solutions will
face an uphill battle, in that they not only have to bring about
reductions of impact but will also need to counteract the effects of
growing consumption and affluence28,29.
To avoid further deterioration and irreversible damage to
natural and societal systems, there will need to be a global and
rapid decoupling of detrimental impacts from economic activity.
Whilst a number of countries in the global North have recently
managed to reduce greenhouse-gas emissions while still growing
their economies30, it is highly unlikely that such decoupling will
occur more widely in the near future, rapidly enough at global
scale and for other environmental impacts11,17. This is because
renewable energy, electrification, carbon-capturing technologies
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Fig. 1 Relative change in main global economic and environmental
indicators from 1970 to 2017. Shown is how the global material footprint
(MF, equal to global raw material extraction) and global CO2 emissions
from fossil-fuel combustion and industrial processes (CO2 FFI) changed
compared with global GDP (constant 2010 USD). Indexed to 1 in 1990. Data
sources: https://www.resourcepanel.org/global-material-flows-database,
http://www.globalcarbonatlas.org and https://data.worldbank.org.
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and even services all have resource requirements, mostly in the
form of metals, concrete and land31. Rising energy demand and
costs of resource extraction, technical limitations and rebound
effects aggravate the problem28,32,33. It has therefore been argued
that “policy makers have to acknowledge the fact that addressing
environmental breakdown may require a direct downscaling of
economic production and consumption in the wealthiest
countries”17,p.5. We will address this argument in the section
on systemic drivers and possible solutions.
International disparities. In what follows, we will explain why
we characterise consumption as affluence. Inequality is com-
monly described by the Gini index, with 0 characterising total
equality (all individuals equal) and 100 representing total
inequality (one individual owning everything). World countries’
Gini indices of income inequality range between 25 (Scandinavia)
and 63 (Southern Africa)34. The world’s Gini index of income
inequality is around 75, higher than the corresponding index of
any national population. Simply put, the world as a whole is more
unequal than any individual country.
Since income is strongly linked with consumption, and
consumption is in turn linked with impact (see previous section),
we can expect existing income inequalities to translate into
equally significant impact inequalities. Indeed, environmental,
resource and social impacts are exerted unequally across the
world population. Teixido-Figueras et al.35 report that interna-
tional Gini coefficients for CO2 emissions, material consumption
and net primary productivity (both measured from a production
and consumption perspective) range between 35 and 60. These
values mean that the world’s top 10% of income earners are
responsible for between 25 and 43% of environmental impact. In
contrast, the world’s bottom 10% income earners exert only
around 3–5% of environmental impact35. These findings mean
that environmental impact is to a large extent caused and driven
by the world’s rich citizens36. Considering that the lifestyles of
wealthy citizens are characterised by an abundance of choice,
convenience and comfort, we argue that the determinant and
driver we have referred to in previous sections as consumption, is
more aptly labelled as affluence.
Teixido-Figueras et al.35 also find that carbon emissions and
material use are globally more unequally distributed when
accounted for as footprints. In contrast to territorial allocations,
footprints attribute environmental burdens to the final consumer,
no matter where the initial environmental pressure has occurred.
Here, international trade is responsible for shifting burdens from
mostly low-income developing-world producers to high-income
developed-world consumers37. This phenomenon of outsourcing
appears to exacerbate global disparities, at least in carbon
emissions and material use contexts.
Systemic drivers and possible solutions
As the previous section shows, there is a positive relationship
between biophysical resource use and affluence, as defined by
income. Adding to this, the most affluent groups have higher
incomes than expenditure, and their saving and investing leads to
substantial additional environmental impact38. Therefore, and
due to significant inter- and intra-national wealth and income
inequality36,39, we differentiate between globally affluent groups,
such as the European Union, and the most wealthy and affluent
groups within countries, e.g. the <1–10% richest income seg-
ments36. As quantitative research36,40,41 shows, highly affluent
consumers drive biophysical resource use (a) directly through
high consumption, (b) as members of powerful factions of the
capitalist class and (c) through driving consumption norms
across the population. The next sections focus on affluent groups
globally and on the intra-nationally most wealthy and affluent
segments (hereafter called super-affluent).
Reducing overconsumption. Since the level of consumption
determines total impacts, affluence needs to be addressed by
reducing consumption, not just greening it17,28,29. It is clear that
prevailing capitalist, growth-driven economic systems have not
only increased affluence since World War II, but have led to
enormous increases in inequality, financial instability, resource
consumption and environmental pressures on vital earth support
systems42. A suitable concept to address the ecological dimension
is the widely established avoid-shift-improve framework outlined
by Creutzig et al.43. Its focus on the end-use service, such as
mobility, nutrition or shelter, allows for a multi-dimensional
analysis of potential impact reductions beyond sole technological
change. This analysis can be directed at human need satisfaction
or decent living standards—an alternative perspective put for-
ward for curbing environmental crises44,45. Crucially, this per-
spective allows us to consider different provisioning systems (e.g.
states, markets, communities and households) and to differentiate
between superfluous consumption, which is consumption that
does not contribute to needs satisfaction, and necessary con-
sumption which can be related to satisfying human needs. It
remains important to acknowledge the complexities surrounding
this distinction, as touched upon in the sections on growth
imperatives below. Still, empirically, human needs satisfaction
shows rapidly diminishing returns with overall consumption45,46.
As implied by the previous section on affluence as a driver, the
strongest pillar of the necessary transformation is to avoid or to
reduce consumption until the remaining consumption level falls
within planetary boundaries, while fulfilling human needs17,28,46.
Avoiding consumption means not consuming certain goods and
services, from living space (overly large homes, secondary
residences of the wealthy) to oversized vehicles, environmentally
damaging and wasteful food, leisure patterns and work patterns
involving driving and flying47. This implies reducing expenditure
and wealth along ‘sustainable consumption corridors’, i.e.
minimum and maximum consumption standards48,49 (Fig. 2).
On the technological side, reducing the need for consumption can
be facilitated by changes such as increasing lifespans of goods,
telecommunication instead of physical travel, sharing and
repairing instead of buying new, and house retrofitting43.
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Fig. 2 The safe and just space for humanity. Sustainable lifestyles are
situated between an upper limit of permissible use (“Environmental
ceiling”) and a lower limit of necessary use of environmental resources
(“Social foundation”) (figures from ref. 49 and ref. 84 combined and adapted).
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However, the other two pillars of shift and improve are still
vital to achieve the socio-ecological transformation46. Consump-
tion patterns still need to be shifted away from resource and
carbon-intensive goods and services, e.g. mobility from cars and
airplanes to public buses and trains, biking or walking, heating
from oil heating to heat pumps, nutrition—where possible—from
animal to seasonal plant-based products43,46. In some cases this
includes a shift from high- to low-tech (with many low-tech
alternatives being less energy intense than high-tech equivalents,
e.g. clothes line vs. dryer) and from global to local47. In parallel,
also the resource and carbon intensity of consumption needs to
be decreased, e.g. by expanding renewable energy, electrifying
cars and public transport and increasing energy and material
efficiency43,46.
The avoid-shift-improve framework, coherently applied with a
dominant avoid and strong shift, implies the adoption of less
affluent, simpler and sufficiency-oriented lifestyles to address
overconsumption—consuming better but less46,47,49,50. This also
includes addressing socially unsustainable underconsumption in
impoverished communities in both less affluent and affluent
countries, where enough and better is needed to achieve a more
equal distribution of wealth and guarantee a minimum level of
prosperity to overcome poverty48,49. Thus, establishing a floor-
and-ceiling strategy of sustainable consumption corridors is
necessary48,49 (Fig. 2).
It is well established that at least in the affluent countries a
persistent, deep and widespread reduction of consumption and
production would reduce economic growth as measured by gross
domestic product (GDP)51,52. Estimates of the needed reduction
of resource and energy use in affluent countries, resulting in a
concomitant decrease in GDP of similar magnitude, range from
40 to 90%53,54. Bottom-up studies, such as from Rao et al.55 show
that decent living standards could be maintained in India, Brazil
and South Africa with around 90% less per-capita energy use than
currently consumed in affluent countries. Trainer56, for Australia,
and Lockyer57, for the USA, find similar possible reductions. In
current capitalist economies such reduction pathways would
imply widespread economic recession with a cascade of currently
socially detrimental effects, such as a collapse of the stock market,
unemployment, firm bankruptcies and lack of credit50,58. The
question then becomes how such a reduction in consumption and
production can be made socially sustainable, safeguarding human
needs and social function50,59 However, to address this question,
we first need to understand the various growth imperatives of
capitalist social and economic systems and the role of the super-
affluent segments of society60.
Super-affluent consumers and growth imperatives. Growth
imperatives are active at multiple levels, making the pursuit of
economic growth (net investment, i.e. investment above depre-
ciation) a necessity for different actors and leading to social and
economic instability in the absence of it7,52,60. Following a
Marxian perspective as put forward by Pirgmaier and Steinber-
ger61, growth imperatives can be attributed to capitalism as the
currently dominant socio-economic system in affluent
countries7,51,62, although this is debated by other scholars52. To
structure this topic, we will discuss different affected actors
separately, namely corporations, states and individuals, following
Richters and Siemoneit60. Most importantly, we address the role
of the super-affluent consumers within a society, which overlap
with powerful fractions of the capitalist class. From a Marxian
perspective, this social class is structurally defined by its position
in the capitalist production process, as financially tied with the
function of capital63. In capitalism, workers are separated from
the means of production, implying that they must compete in
labour markets to sell their labour power to capitalists in order to
earn a living.
Even though some small- and medium-sized businesses
manage to refrain from pursuing growth, e.g. due to a low
competition intensity in niche markets, or lack of financial debt
imperatives, this cannot be said for most firms64. In capitalism,
firms need to compete in the market, leading to a necessity to
reinvest profits into more efficient production processes to
minimise costs (e.g. through replacing human labour power with
machines and positive returns to scale), innovation of new
products and/or advertising to convince consumers to buy
more7,61,62. As a result, the average energy intensity of labour is
now twice as high as in 195060. As long as a firm has a
competitive advantage, there is a strong incentive to sell as much
as possible. Financial markets are crucial to enable this constant
expansion by providing (interest-bearing) capital and channelling
it where it is most profitable58,61,63. If a firm fails to stay
competitive, it either goes bankrupt or is taken over by a more
successful business. Under normal economic conditions, this
capitalist competition is expected to lead to aggregate growth
dynamics7,62,63,65.
However, two factors exist that further strengthen this growth
dynamic60. Firstly, if labour productivity continuously rises, then
aggregate economic growth becomes necessary to keep employ-
ment constant, otherwise technological unemployment results.
This creates one of the imperatives for capitalist states to foster
aggregate growth, since with worsening economic conditions and
high unemployment, tax revenues shrink, e.g. from labour and
value-added taxes, while social security expenditures rise60,62.
Adding to this, states compete with other states geopolitically and
in providing favourable conditions for capital, while capitalists
have the resources to influence political decisions in their favour.
If economic conditions are expected to deteriorate, e.g. due to
unplanned recession or progressive political change, firms can
threaten capital flight, financial markets react and investor as well
as consumer confidence shrink51,58,60. Secondly, consumers
usually increase their consumption in tune with increasing
production60. This process can be at least in part explained by
substantial advertising efforts by firms47,52,66. However, further
mechanisms are at play as explained further below.
Following this analysis, it is not surprising that the growth
paradigm is hegemonic, i.e. the perception that economic growth
solves all kinds of societal problems, that it equals progress, power
and welfare and that it can be made practically endless through
some form of supposedly green or sustainable growth59. Taken
together, the described dynamics create multiple dependencies of
workers, firms and states on a well-functioning capital accumula-
tion and thus wield more material, institutional and discursive
power (e.g. for political lobbying) to capitalists who are usually
the most affluent consumers61,67. Even if different fractions of the
capitalist class have manifold and competing interests which need
to be constantly renegotiated, there is a common interest in
maintaining the capitalist system and favourable conditions for
capital accumulation, e.g. through aggregate growth and high
consumption51,62. How this political corruption by the super-
affluent plays out in practice is well documented, e.g. for the meat
industry in Denmark6.
Super-affluent consumers drive consumption norms. Growth
imperatives and drivers (with the latter describing less coercive
mechanisms to increase consumption) can also be active at the
individual level. In this case, the level of consumption can serve as
a proxy47,60,68. To start with, individual consumption decisions
are not made in a vacuum, but are shaped by surrounding
(physical and social) structures and provisioning systems47,61,69.
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Sanne66 and Alexander47 discuss several structural barriers to
sufficiency-oriented lifestyles, locking in high consumption.
These include lack of suitable housing, insufficient options for
socialising, employment, transport and information, as well as
high exposure to consumer temptations. Often, these conditions
are deliberately fostered by states and also capitalists (the latter
overlapping with super-affluent consumers and having dis-
proportionate influence on states) to increase consumption61,66.
Further active mechanisms to spur growth include positional
and efficiency consumption, which contribute to an increase in
consumption overall52,60,68,70. After basic material needs are
satisfied, an increasing proportion of consumption is directed at
positional goods52,70. The defining feature of these goods is that
they are expensive and signify social status. Access to them
depends on the income relative to others. Status matters, since
empirical studies show that currently relative income is one of the
strongest determinants of individual happiness52. In the aggregate
however, the pursuit of positional consumption, driven by super-
affluent consumers and high inequalities, likely resembles a zero-
sum game with respect to societal wellbeing70,71. With every actor
striving to increase their position relative to their peers, the
average consumption level rises and thus even more expensive
positional goods become necessary, while the societal wellbeing
level stagnates42,71. This is supported by a large body of empirical
research, showing that an individual’s happiness correlates
positively with their own income but negatively with the peer
group’s income71 and that unequal access to positional goods
fosters rising consumption52. This endless process is a core part
of capitalism as it keeps social momentum and consumption high
with affluent consumers driving aspirations and hopes of social
ascent in low-affluence segments70,72. The positional consump-
tion behaviour of the super-affluent thus drives consumption
norms across the population, for instance through their excessive
air travel, as documented by Gössling73.
Lastly, in capitalism, workers must compete against each other
in the labour market in order to earn a living from capitalists7,63.
Following Siemoneit68, this can lead to a similar imperative to net
invest (increase the level of consumption/investment) as is
observed with capitalists. In order to stay competitive, individuals
are pushed to increase time and cost efficiency by investing in
cars, kitchen appliances, computers and smartphones, by using
social media and online trade etc. This efficiency consumption—
effectively another facet of the rebound effect38,47,68—helps to
manage high workloads, thus securing an income, while
maintaining private life. This is often accompanied by trends of
commodification61, understood as the marketisation of products
and services which used to be provisioned through more time-
intensive commons or reciprocal social arrangements, e.g.
convenience food vs. cooking together. As in the food example74,
this replacement of human labour with energy- and material-
intensive industrial production typically increases environmental
pressures47,75. Through these economic pressures, positive feed-
back loops and lock-ins are expected to emerge, since other
consumers need to keep up with these investments or face
disadvantages, e.g. when car or smartphone ownership become
presupposed. Taken together with positional consumption,
structural barriers to sufficiency and the substantial advertising
efforts by capitalists, these mechanisms explain to a large extent
why consumers seem so willing to increase their consumption in
accordance with increasing production60.
Solution approaches. In response to the aforementioned drivers
of affluence, diverse solution approaches and strategies are being
discussed47,52,76. We differentiate these as belonging to a more
reformist and a more radical group (Table 1). This is based on the
categorisation by Alexander and Rutherford77. All these approa-
ches differ from the established green growth (ecomodernism)
approach28,78,79, in that they at least adopt an agnostic, if not
negative, position on the question whether or not GDP can be
sufficiently decoupled from environmental impacts28,52,78,80.
Hence, these approaches also differ from the Sustainable Devel-
opment Goals (SDGs), since SDG 8 aims for continued global
GDP growth of ~3% p.a., likely contradicting several other SDGs,
e.g. SDG 12 and 1381–83. Further, the SDGs are not representing a
theoretically coherent framework, since they are part of a delib-
erative process45, and sideline underlying power dynamics as well
as interactions between injustices83. Nevertheless, approaches
underpinned by multi-dimensional social wellbeing and environ-
mental goals, such as Kate Raworth’s Doughnut Economics84, are
strong alternatives to GDP-focused ones and may inspire trans-
formative change in the context of the more reformist solution
approaches outlined below. Importantly, the following discussion
can only provide a rough overview of the respective approaches.
The reformist group consists of heterogeneous approaches
such as a-growth80, precautionary/pragmatic post-growth52,
prosperity42 and managing85 without growth as well as steady-
state economics86. These approaches have in common that they
aim to achieve the required socio-ecological transformation
through and within today’s dominant institutions, such as
centralised democratic states and market economies52,77. From
this position it often follows that current, socially vital
institutions, such as the welfare state, labour markets, healthcare,
pensions and others, need to be reformed to become independent
from GDP growth52. Generally, bottom-up movements are seen
as crucial, leading to value and cultural changes towards
sufficiency42,47. Eventually, however, significant policy changes
are proposed to achieve the necessary downshifting of consump-
tion and production42,77,86 and/or the reduction of environ-
mental impacts through decoupling52,80. These include, among
others, stringent eco-taxes or cap-and trade systems, directed
investments in green industries and public institutions, wealth
redistribution through taxation and a maximum income, a
guaranteed basic income and/or reduced working hours42,77.
Although these policies already seem radical when compared to
today’s policies, the proponents of reformist approaches are
convinced that the transformation can be achieved in current
capitalist economies and democratic states42,77,86.
The second, more radical, group disagrees and argues that the
needed socio-ecological transformation will necessarily entail a
shift beyond capitalism and/or current centralised states.
Although comprising considerable heterogeneity77, it can be
divided into eco-socialist approaches, viewing the democratic
state as an important means to achieve the socio-ecological
transformation51,65 and eco-anarchist approaches, aiming instead
at participatory democracy without a state, thus minimising
hierarchies54,87. Many degrowth approaches combine elements of
the two, but often see a stronger role for state action than eco-
anarchists50,51,88. Degrowth is defined here as “an equitable
downscaling of throughput [that is the energy and resource flows
through an economy, strongly coupled to GDP], with a
concomitant securing of wellbeing“59,p7, aimed at a subsequent
downscaled steady-state economic system that is socially just and
in balance with ecological limits. Importantly, degrowth does not
aim for a reduction of GDP per se, but rather accepts it as a likely
outcome of the necessary changes78. Moreover, eco-feminist
approaches highlight the role of patriarchal social relations and
the parallels between the oppression of women and exploitation
of nature89, while post-development approaches stress the
manifold and heterogeneous visions of achieving such a socio-
ecological transformation globally, especially in the global
South90.
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Table 1 Meta approaches for sustainable prosperity.
Radical approaches Reformist approaches Green growth approach
Sub-group Eco-socialism
(incl. degrowth)
Eco-anarchism A-growth, precautionary/
pragmatic post-growth, steady-
state economy, prosperity and
managing without growth
Sustainable growth, ecological
modernisation, decoupling
Key references 47,50,51,59,65 54,87 42,52,80,85,86 28,78,79
Key premise/principle/
hypothesis/assumptions
• Decoupling is most likely not
possible
• Necessary changes are most
likely not compatible with
capitalism
• The democratic state is expected
to play a significant role in the
transition and beyond, although
grassroots movements are still
important
• Decoupling is most likely not
possible
• Necessary changes are most
likely not compatible with
capitalism
• The state is not expected to
play a significant role in the
transition. Instead, grassroots
participatory-democratic
movements are central in the
transition and beyond
• Group 1: infinite growth on a
finite planet (decoupling) is most
likely not possible (Daly, Victor
or Jackson)
• Group 2: agnostic to growth;
decoupling could still be possible;
uncertainty (van den Bergh,
Petschow et al.)
• Necessary changes are
compatible with centralised
states and capitalism
• Economic growth can be
decoupled from environmental
impacts and is necessary to
provide sustainable technical
solutions.
• Necessary changes are
compatible with centralised
states and capitalism
Goals/aspirations Decouple wellbeing from GDP
growth, shrink impacts and expect
GDP shrinkage, increase social
control over economy using
the state
Decouple wellbeing from GDP
growth, shrink impacts and
expect GDP shrinkage, increase
social control over economy
without using the state
Decouple wellbeing from GDP
growth, shrink impacts despite
possible/likely GDP decrease
Maintain high economic growth
and decrease impacts
(decoupling)
Mechanisms Focus on resource limits, system
change and wellbeing
Focus on resource limits, system
change and wellbeing
Focus on resource limits, reforms
and wellbeing
Focus on resource efficiency,
renewable energy and
decoupling
Institutions/actors Governments, civil society and
grassroots initiatives, voters,
scientists
Civil society and grassroots
initiatives, scientists
Governments, civil society and
grassroots initiatives, voters,
scientists
Governments, financial
institutions, voters, scientists,
Actions Include strong limits and social
justice in policies; Change
economic structures, reform
institutions and increase social
control over economic actions;
change lifestyles, consciousness
and cultures through
grassroots action
Change lifestyles, cultures and
consciousness through
grassroots action; Build
alternative localised
participatory-democratic
economic system besides old
one and remove barriers
through cooperating with
governments
Include strong limits and social
justice in policies; reform important
social institutions; change lifestyles
and cultures through
grassroots action
Adapt policies to include
increases in efficiencies
Achievements/examples
/implementations
Individual downshifting, transition
Initiatives, eco-villages, policy
reforms e.g. the 2019 Wellbeing
Budget in New Zealand as a very
first step
Individual downshifting,
transition initiatives, eco-
villages, Catalan Integral
Cooperative, Rojava, Zapatistas
Individual downshifting, transition
initiatives, eco-villages, policy
reforms, e.g. the 2019 Wellbeing
Budget in New Zealand as a
first step
OECD and EU policies
Barriers Lack of awareness among the
public of limits to growth and
alternatives; lack of research on
these alternatives; changes could
be too radical to be implemented;
growth imperatives of states could
be too much a barrier
Lack of awareness among the
public of limits to growth and
alternatives; lack of research on
these alternatives; changes
could be too radical to be
implemented; barriers to
grassroots action could be
too high
Lack of awareness among the
public of limits to growth and
alternatives; lack of research on
these alternatives; potential that
problems cannot be solved within
capitalism and centralised states
Priority still on economic growth
Alignment with dominant
interests, systems and
cultures
Low Low Low (Group 1) to medium
(Group 2)
High
This table only provides a rough overview, focusing on the most obvious differences of the respective approaches. There are overlaps between them and considerable heterogeneity within each approach, e.g. eco-feminism and post-development overlap with eco-socialism and
eco-anarchism.
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unications
Degrowth advocates propose similar policy changes as the
reformist group50,80. However, it is stressed that implementing
these changes would most likely imply a shift beyond capitalism,
e.g. preventing capital accumulation through dis-economies of
scale and collective firm ownership, and thus require radical
social change59,62,91. Eco-socialists usually focus more on
rationing, planning of investments and employment, price
controls and public ownership of at least the most central means
of production to plan their downscaling in a socially sustainable
way65,77.
Both groups agree on the crucial role of bottom-up movements
to change culture and values, push for the implementation of
these top-down changes and establish parts of the new economy
within the old47,50. Finally, eco-anarchists do not view the state as
a central means to achieve the socio-ecological transformation.
Instead, they stress the role of bottom-up grassroots initiatives,
such as transition initiatives and eco-villages, in prefiguring the
transformation as well as cultural and value changes as a
necessary precondition for wider radical change. With these
initiatives scaling up, the state might get used to remove barriers
and to support establishing a participatory-democratic and
localised post-capitalist economy54,77.
In summary, there seems to be some strategic overlap between
reformist and the more radical eco-anarchist and eco-socialist
approaches, at least in the short term77. The question remains
how these solution approaches help in overcoming the capitalist
dynamics previously outlined, since here bottom-up and govern-
mental action seem to be limited. It is important to recognise the
pivotal role of social movements in this process, which can bring
forward social tipping points through complex, unpredictable and
reinforcing feedbacks92,93 and create windows of opportunity
from crises77,94.
New research directions
The evidence is clear. Long-term and concurrent human and
planetary wellbeing will not be achieved in the Anthropocene if
affluent overconsumption continues, spurred by economic sys-
tems that exploit nature and humans. We find that, to a large
extent, the affluent lifestyles of the world’s rich determine and
drive global environmental and social impact. Moreover, inter-
national trade mechanisms allow the rich world to displace its
impact to the global poor. Not only can a sufficient decoupling of
environmental and detrimental social impacts from economic
growth not be achieved by technological innovation alone, but
also the profit-driven mechanism of prevailing economic systems
prevents the necessary reduction of impacts and resource utili-
sation per se.
In this context, the digital revolution—and more broadly the
Fourth Industrial Revolution (FIR) with converging, step-change
innovations in digital technology, artificial intelligence, Internet
of Things, 3D-printing, biotechnology and nanotechnology—has
been touted as an enabler of absolute decoupling through sheer
exponential efficiency gains95. While digitalisation is already a key
driving force in societal transformation, it has so far led to more
consumption and inequality and remained coupled with the
indirect use of energy and materials, therefore sustaining
resource-intensive and greenhouse-gas growth patterns at the
macro-economic level17,96. While the digital revolution
undoubtedly increases labour productivity—demonstrated by
individual leading businesses showing a strong productivity
paradox—it remains to be seen whether the same is true for
resource productivity, and this will depend on governance and
regulation. Even if the FIR were to achieve absolute decoupling,
this would come at a potentially high risk for privacy, liberty, data
sovereignty, civic rights, security, equality and democracy96,97.
What is needed are convincing and viable solutions at the
systems level that can be followed. We call for the scientific
community across all disciplines to identify and support solutions
with multidisciplinary research, for the public to engage in broad
discussions about solutions and for policy makers to implement
and enable solutions in policy processes. Based on the literature
reviewed above we identify the following areas in need of further
research. This list is not exhaustive or even fully conclusive, but
rather meant to be the start of a continuous debate to frame
future agendas of research and actions that need to be discussed
and criticised.
Research to advance basic academic understanding. Can
inspiring visions for a sustainable life in prosperity, but within
planetary limits and with less material affluence be formulated
and demonstrated? How can fundamental changes in lifestyles of
the affluent part of the human population be motivated and
sustained?
The interface between materially downshifted lifestyles and the
social environment (institutions, values, norms and governance)
needs special attention. Which circumstances will allow for and
support widespread shifts in lifestyles? What are the institutional,
cultural and individual barriers to adopting lifestyle changes and
how can they be overcome? What is the role of social groups,
organisations and bottom-up movements? Can we learn from
societies, e.g. indigenous and pre-industrial societies, which
managed to live without economic growth?
So far, steady-state, degrowth or a-growth concepts have not
practically been implemented on larger scales. Research on the
environmental and social sustainability of these propositions is
necessary (see e.g. ref. 78). Can a transition to reduced and
changed consumption be achieved while at the same time keeping
economic and social stability? What are the implications on work,
employment and population growth? How can social security be
maintained and equality be increased? What are the consequences
for trade and for the global South in particular?
The scientific community should develop scenarios and
possible pathways of strong sustainable consumption and
production with upper and lower limits as suggested by the
floor-and-ceiling framework, or sustainable consumption
corridors48,49,91,98. These need to feature reduced physical
throughput (possibly resulting in reduced GDP) and recomposing
consumption99 with a simultaneous social reorientation of
people, institutions and governments. Suitable indicators and
scenarios based on interdisciplinary research need to be
implemented to monitor progress100.
Research on societal changes for citizens and communities.
One first and immediate action anyone can take is to talk about
overconsumption, i.e. current levels of consumption by most
people in the global North, and how it is unsustainable and
unethical or unjust. A wide debate in society, research and policy
is necessary. Many people do not see themselves being part of
either the problem or the solution, but look for governments,
technology and/or businesses to solve the problem. The necessary
alternative futures need to be discussed, envisioned and shared. It
is important to create a sense of collective responsibility and
action. Social sciences research and approaches can help by
creating, providing and sharing concepts, experiences and plat-
forms where public debates and dialogues take place. People who
have already downshifted should be enabled to share their
motivations and experiences to break through stigma and isola-
tion, as would activists building a larger popular movement on
climate action.
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Research can identify the main issues to focus on primarily
(flying, meat and dairy products, car driving, household
sufficiency, etc.) and how cultures of sufficiency, care, solidarity
and simplicity can be created. Individuals can downshift together
as households and communities. Research can help to re-envision
and reorganise cities to allow for shorter distances, closer
communities, higher self-sufficiency, increased local place identity
and more decentralised production, including that of food. More
importantly, citizens can learn to engage as social actors to bring
forward social tipping points92. These social tipping points
include, for instance, removing fossil-fuel subsidies and invest-
ments, building decentralised energy generation or low-carbon
cities. Such macro-efforts are clearly more important than
individual ones, could help to address possible sufficiency
rebound effects47 and thus deserve increased research attention
and guidance.
Adding to this, as Smith et al.93 point out in reaction to Otto
et al.92, it is crucial to ask “Who initiates deliberate, radical
change in the collective interest?” and to recognise the pivotal role
of social movements in this process.
Research on governance. A number of concrete policy proposals
for governance can be extracted from the literature (see also
Cosme et al.76). All of these will need further scrutiny and
research on their feasibility and implementation:
First, replace GDP as a measure of prosperity with a multitude
of alternative indicators and be agnostic to growth. Expect likely
shrinking of GDP if sufficient environmental policies are enacted.
Research needs to advise on how best to monitor and report
progress towards human and planetary wellbeing.
Second, empower people and strengthen participation in
democratic processes and enable stronger local self-governance.
Design governance and institutions to allow for social experi-
ments, engagement and innovation. This could be trialled and
organised e.g. through citizen assemblies or juries, as is demanded
by Extinction Rebellion and already practised e.g. by Transition
Initiatives or the Catalan Integral Cooperative92.
Third, strengthen equality and redistribution through suitable
taxation policies, basic income and job guarantees and by setting
maximum income levels, expanding public services and rolling
back neoliberal reforms (e.g. as part of a Green New Deal79).
Stronger regulation might be needed to ban certain products or
ecologically destructive industries that have thrived on a legacy of
vested interests, lobbying and state-supported subsidies.
Fourth, the transformation of economic systems can be
supported with innovative business models that encourage
sharing and giving economies, based on cooperation, commu-
nities and localised economies instead of competition. Research is
needed to create, assess and revise suitable policy instruments.
And finally, capacity building, knowledge transfer and educa-
tion—including media and advertising—need to be adapted to
support local sufficiency projects and citizen initiatives.
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